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THE LAW OF HYBRID SECURITIES
RUDOLF E. UHLMANt
The distinction between corporate creditors and stockholders
is as old as the law of corporations itself. Although the principle
of the limited liability of stockholders is of comparatively recent
origin,' it has been recognized at all times that stockholders are
members of the corporation, while corporate creditors are strang-
ers to the corporate entity.2 This is also true as to those creditors
of the company who belong to the class of bondholders. They are
investors in the corporate business like the stockholders, but their
status is fundamentally different from that of members of the
company. They do not share in the profits or losses of the com-
pany and have no part in the control or management of the cor-
poration. Because of this difference in the status of bondholders
and stockholders, certificates evidencing contributions to the cor-
porate capital are of an essentially different nature depending
on whether they constitute bond or stock certificates. If the
certificate is a bond certificate, it represents an obligation of the
corporation to pay a fixed sum with stated interest. If it is a
stock certificate, it confers upon the holder a part ownership of
the corporate assets and a right to participate in the surplus
profits of the corporation and, on its dissolution, in the assets
remaining after payment of the creditors. 3
This distinction between stockholders and bondholders, simple
and clear-cut as it was originally, has been obscured by virtue
of the expansion of corporate financing during the last half cen-
tury. The dispersion of stock ownership in the large corpora-
tions which was followed by the concentration of corporate con-
trol in the hands of minority groups has changed the position of
the small stockholders in such corporations. Although remaining
stockholders in name, they have surrendered many of their pre-
rogatives as members of the corporation and have nearly ap-
f Research Fellow, Harvard Law School. J. U. D. (Tuebingen 1933),
LL.B. (Cornell 1936).
1. Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800(1888) 2 Earv. L. Rev. 149, 160.
2. Ber, The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockholders(1928) 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 814, 815.
3. Stevens, Corporations (1936) 362.
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proached the status of mere lenders of money. On the other hand,
investors who purchase long-term bonds are just as intimately
connected with the corporate business as the stockholders. "In-
terest return and ultimate payment of their money turn just as
surely on the fidelity and business integrity of the management
as do dividends and ultimate liquidation for stockholders."14 Thus,
the distinction between stockholders and bondholders, important
as it is in theory, has lost much of its economical significance.
In legal theory the bondholder lends money to an enter-
prise in which he is not a participant. Whatever interest in
property or control is given him is mere security for a loan.
He is to be contrasted as sharply as possible with a stock-
holder. He is not an investor, not an owner. He is distinctly
an outsider. At one time in the history of business such may
have been the true situation of the bondholder, but it is not
today. He is distinctly an investor. The great investment
bankers when they take up the problem of financing an en-
terprise, decide between financing through stocks and financ-
ing through bonds on the basis of a very technical study of
the conditions before them. But after they have made their
decision, they sell the stock or bonds equally as investments
to the public. The legal difference between stocks and bonds
plays only an indirect and perhaps a minor part.5
The evolution of corporate financing has rendered it difficult
also to determine often whether a given security is a bond or a
stock certificate. This is particularly true in cases where the
corporation has vested its securities with both bond and stock
features in the hope of enhancing the attractiveness of the issue.
The result of such methods is a group of securities which do not
fall within the category of one of the orthodox instruments of
corporate financing.
It is in the intermediate zone between stocks and bonds
that the "Hybrid Security" is found-a security which repre-
sents an attempt to encompass the advantages of both classi-
fications. To this hybrid the corporation has attempted to
4. Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance (1928) 156. See
also Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation & Private Property (1934)
279. "Though the law still maintains the conception of a sharp dividing
line recognizing the bondholder as a lender of capital and the stockholder
as a quasi-partner in the enterprise, economically the positions of the two
have been drawn together. Consequently, security holders may be regarded
as a hierarchy of individuals all of whom have supplied capital to the
enterprise, and all of whom expect a return from it."
5. Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Security (1923) 37 Harv. L. Rev.
201, 210.
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give the security which lies behind a bond while at the same
time allowing an opportunity for increased income such as
might be returned upon a stock.0
While the parties sometimes thus create securities which might
be called bonds as well as shares of stock, it is the province of
the courts to draw the line of demarcation between creditor and
enterpriser securities. Although in a given case the bond and
stock features of an instrument seem to be hopelessly interwoven,
the courts are called upon to untangle them and decide whether
in the last analysis the bond or the stock character of the instru-
ment prevails. For in the eyes of the law there are no "hybrid
securities." In the law a person is either a creditor or a stock-
holder; he cannot be both.7
In determining whether a given instrument is a stock certifi-
cate or an evidence of indebtedness, the courts will apply the
traditional canons of interpretation. The courts will, therefore,
disregard mere nomenclature and look to the substance of the
instrument, since "to call a thing by a wrong name does not
change its nature."s And they will not be guided by abstract
rules, but will examine the incidents of the factual relationship
which the instrument purports to establish in recognition of the
principle that "the question as to whether the holder of a certifi-
cate issued by a corporation is a member of such corporation,
or whether the certificate is simply evidence of a debt due by
the corporation to the holder, is one that depends upon the pecu-
liar facts of each case."9
In this article the attempt will be made to consider some classes
of typical "hybrid securities" and to analyze the rules which the
courts have developed in determining their nature. Excluded
from this discussion will be those compromise securities the na-
ture of which has not been disputed either in theory or in prac-
tice.10
6. Hansen, Hybrid Securities: A Study of Securities Which Combine
Characteristics of Both Stocks and Bonds (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 407.
7. Warren v. King (1883) 108 U. S. 389, 2 S. Ct. 789, 27 L. ed. 769;
Miller v. Ratterman (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496; Cass v. Realty
Security Co. (1911) 132 N. Y. S. 1074.
8. Burt v. Rattle (1876) 31 Ohio St. 116; In re Fechheimer Fishel Co.
(C. C. A. 2, 1914) 212 Fed. 357.
9. Savannah Real Estate Loan & Building Co. v. Silverberg (1899) 108
Ga. 281, 288, 33 So. 908.
10. The discussion of convertible bonds will, therefore, be beyond the
scope of the paper, since the holders of those bonds are clearly either bond-
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Participating Operation Certificates. The legal character of
so-called participating operation certificates was discussed for
the first time in United States & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone
Auto Gas & Oil Service Co." In this case, the defendant com-
pany operated service stations for the retail sale of gasoline and
other merchandise. In order to raise money, certificates were
issued, under the terms of which the company for a considera-
tion of $250 agreed to create funds by setting aside from the
receipts of specified stations one cent on each gallon of gasoline
and five percent on all other merchandise sold. The funds thus
created were to be distributed at stated periods among the hold-
ers of certificates, until each received the sum of $500. In ac-
cordance with this stipulation, the Keystone Co. had deposited
with several banks funds amounting to about $15,000, designated
as "bond funds" or "sinking funds," when a receiver was ap-
pointed for the company. The certificate holders then brought
suit against the company claiming that they had an equitable
lien upon these funds. The court dismissed the suit holding that
the plaintiffs were not even general creditors.
On general principles of public policy, we believe that this
contract is void as against the claims of general creditors.
To permit corporations, by means of certificates of this kind,
to appropriate corporate assets to certain classes of credi-
tors or shareholders, whatever they may be, would be an
absolute fraud upon the general creditors of the corporation
concerned, and would permit the creation of a special type
of preferred creditors not contemplated by law. If enforce-
able at all, this contract should only be enforced as against
the stockholders of the company, and not against the rights
of creditors who have dealt with the corporation in the ordi-
nary way. To give validity to such a contract would be to
establish a legal vehicle for corporation fraud and illegal
preference of creditors.12
The next reported case" dealing with participating operation
certificates is In re Hawkeye Oil Co.14 The facts of this case were
holders or stockholders depending upon whether they have exercised their
option to convert or not. Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (1930)
166.
11. (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1924) 19 F. (2d) 624.
12. Id. at 626.
13. Prior to that the District Court of Delaware followed the Keystone
case without opinion in Cities Service Refining Co. v. Go-Gas Co. (unre-
ported).
14. (D. C. Del. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 151.
1938]
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similar to those of the Keystone case, supra, except that here the
certificates were expressly secured by mortgages on the corpo-
rate property. The certificate holders petitioned for review of
an order of the referee adjudging the mortgages to be null and
void. The court, however, relying on the Keystone case affirmed
the order. The opinion in reaching this result stressed the fact
that the certificates in question had none of the characteristics
of an indebtedness. Thus, it was held that the certificate holders
did not receive interest on their claims but simply double the
anlount which was paid in, "regardless of the period of time,
whether long or short, required to obtain it under the contract."15
Moreover, it was pointed out that no definite time was fixed by
the contract within which the stipulated amount had to be paid
to the plaintiffs. After having made those findings, the court
limited itself to the statement that the plaintiffs did not come
within the class of general creditors, but the question as to which
status the certificate holders actually had was not decided:
Whether the holders of such contracts are more analogous
to stockholders, than to sleeping partners is not of such vital
importance as the fact that they are not creditors but are
co-adventurers with the stockholders, hazarding their in-
vestment upon the continued operation, and hence upon the
success of the company.16
In Massachusetts Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Go-Gas Co.,17 the court
was presented solely with the question whether a lien given to
the certificate holders would attach to after-acquired property of
the company. The court found that the parties had made no
stipulation to this end and decided, therefore, the question in the
negative, without defining the legal nature of the certificates.18
The most recent case on the problem is Stephenson v. Go-Gas
Co., decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1935.10 In this
case the stipulated funds had not been set aside as it was pro-
vided in the certificates. When the company went into receiver-
ship the certificate holders claimed that the participation certifi-
cates embodied an equitable assignment of the stipulated portion
15. Id. at 152.
16. Ibid.
17. (1927) 259 Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871.
18. The decision was affirmed on rehearing in (1929) 267 Mass. 122,
160 N. E. 563 and the writ of certiorari was denied in (1929) 280 U. S.
604, 50 S. Ct. 86, 74 L. ed. 648.
19. (1935) 268 N. Y. 372, 197 N. E. 317.
Washington University Open Scholarship
THE LAW OF HYBRID SECURITIES
of the future proceeds of the gas stations. The court in dis-
missing the suit emphasized that nothing in the language of the
certificates amounted to an assignment of the future proceeds:
"Those who contributed the funds expected, not reimbursement
to be secured by an assignment of a portion of the proceeds of
sales made by the corporation, but a profit of one hundred per-
cent to be created from the proceeds of the sale. '20 Relying on
the Keystone and Hawkeye cases, supra, the opinion also points
out that a different construction of the certificates would not only
be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the actual agreement,
but would also work injustice to the general creditors. More-
over, the court strongly intimated that the certificate holders
were subordinate even to the stockholders of the company.2' The
New York case, thus, goes beyond the dicta of the Keystone and
Hawkeye cases which give force to the idea that the claims of
the certificate holders might be enforced against the stockholders
of the company. 22
Trade Certificates. In Re Spot Cask Hooper Co.,23 the corpora-
tion had issued so-called trade certificates which, for a considera-
tion of $100, entitled the holders thereof to purchase goods from
the corporation at a profit not to exceed ten percent and in addi-
tion contained the guaranty of an annual dividend of at least
eight percent. On the petition of one of the certificate holders,
the court declared that the certificate embodied an indebtedness
which was provable under Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act.24
This result seems to be squarely in conflict with the attitude
which the courts have taken in the cases dealing with the financ-
ing of gasoline chain stores by means of participating operation
certificates. The Hooper case, accordingly, has met with much
adverse criticism. 25
Tontine Insurance Policies. The so-called Tontine Insurance
policies which flourished toward the end of the last century,
present another type of hybrid securities. Under the Tontine
20. See 268 N. Y. at 380. For a detailed discussion of the case see Note
(1936) 21 Cornell L. Q. 299.
21. Stephenson v. Go-Gas Co. (1935) 268 N. Y. 372, 381, 197 N. E. 317.
22. U. S. & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Service Co.
(D. C. Del. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 151, 152.
23. (D. C. W. D. Texas 1911) 188 Fed. 861.
24. Id. at 863.
25. Berl, The Vanishing Distinction Between Creditors and Stockhold-
ers (1928) 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 814, 822.
1938]
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Insurance plan, the insured was the holder of an endowment
policy which was to run for a stated period. If the insured died
during this period his beneficiary could collect the face amount
of the policy. But if he survived the endowment period, he was
entitled to the face amount of the policy and all the profits which
might have accrued to the policy. The legal nature of those poli-
cies was the subject of numerous controversies. While the hold-
ers of death claims were considered as creditors, the character
of the claims brought by the holders of unmatured policies was
more dubious.
In People v. Security Life Insurance Co., 26 suit was brought
by the holders of unmatured life policies against the receiver of
an insolvent insurance company for the face amount of their
policies and profits accrued. The receiver claimed that the hold-
ers of running policies were not creditors and, therefore, not
entitled to share in the corporate assets until after payment of
the death claim and of other creditors. The court, however, rely-
ing on an earlier New York case, 27 held that the relationship of
the company and the holders of unmatured policies was that of
debtor and creditor. The court, therefore, refused to accept
the theory of the receiver that the plaintiffs were merely "part-
ners" of the company. "They who pay their money for insur-
ances are no more jointly interested, or in any sense partners,
than the depositors in a bank." 28
In Pierce v. Equitable Life Assur. Society,2 the facts were
,similar to those in the Security Life Insurance Co. case. Like
the New York. court there, the Massachusetts court here held
that the holder of a running Tontine Insurance policy was to bp
regarded as a creditor and not as a member of the corporation."0
"Bonds" as Preferred Stock,. In a series of cases the courts
have construed securities, which were denominated as "bonds,"
as a species of preferred stock, if those securities had stock
,rather than debt features. The first in this line of cases is Cass
26. (1879) 78 N. Y. 114.
27. Cohen v. New York Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1872) 50 N. Y. 110.
28. People v. Security Life Ins. Co. (1879) 78 N. Y. 114, 123. Accord,
Uhlman v. New York Life Insurance Co. (1888) 109 N. Y. 421.
29. (1887) 145 Mass. 56, 61, 12 N. E. 858.
30. See 145 Mass. at 61. Accord, Peters v. Equitable Life Assurance Co.(1907) 196 Mass. 143, 81 N. E. 964. An analogy to the Tontine Insurance
cases is furnished by the case of Flaherty v. Mfg. Club of Philadelphia(1932) 104 Pa. Super. Ct. 546, 159 Atl. 209.
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v. Realty Securities Co.- In this case instruments which were
designated as "bonds" and were secured by a junior lien upon
certain corporate property were held actually to represent noth-
ing more than preferred stock. The instruments contained a
promise to pay a certain sum of money at a fixed time, and to
pay, meanwhile, a stated rate of interest, but it was also provided
that upon liquidation of the company the holders of the instru-
ments were entitled to a proportionate share in the surplus in-
come, after payment of certain fixed dividends on the common
and preferred stock had been made. Moreover, it was stipulated
that the "bonds" should be satisfied, not only upon payment of
their face value, but also upon payment of a rateable proportion
of the assets, whether more or less than the face value. Consid-
ering those features of the instruments, the court concluded
The attempt seems to have been to devise a form of secur-
ity which should possess all the attributes of stock, including
a right to share ratably in the profits and increase in value,
and at the same time to preserve a specific lien upon the
company's assets which should be superior to the claims of
creditors. This cannot be lawfully done for the two things
are inherently inconsistent. It is said that we can sever the
good from the bad, and disregard the features which as-
similate these securities to stock, retaining and affirming
their validity as bonds. This, as it seems to me, would be to
make a new contract for the parties.82
Similarly, in Hilson Co. v. State Board,3 the court held so-
called debenture certificates with stock features to be corporate
stock. The court reached this conclusion after it had found "that
these debenture certificates, although they recite that the cor-
poration is indebted to the holders thereof in the amount of their
face value, disclose on their face that their holders are clothed
with rights and privileges which our Corporation Act permits
stockholders only to enjoy."' 4
31. (1911) 132 N. Y. S. 1074, aff'd in (1912) 206 N. Y. 649, 99 N. E.
1105.
32. See 132 N. Y. S. at 1078. Accord, Matter of Collier (1920) 182
N. Y. S. 93. But cf. the dissenting opinion in the Cass case: "There has
been an attempt to give the bondholders certain rights of stockholders in
given contingencies which have not transpired; but a marked distinction
is made between the bonds and stock and the rights of the holders of each.
If it had been supposed or intended that the effect of each was the same,
both would not have been provided for. Where the provisions of a contract,
some of which are valid and some void, are severable, the valid provisions
may be sustained and enforced." See 132 N. Y. S. at 1083.
33. (1911) 82 N. 3. L. 2, 80 Atl. 929.
34. See 82 N. J. L. at 3.
19388]
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Another instance of this type of compromise securities are the
"debenture bonds" which came before the court in In re Fech-
heimer Fishei Co.8 5 These securities provided that they should
be subordinate to the claims of the general creditors and that,
upon liquidation or dissolution of the company, the general credi-
tors should be entitled to priority of payment in full. Another
provision was that the instruments should be entitled to receive,
out of the earnings of the company, interest at the rate of eight
percent per annum before any dividend should be set apart or
paid on the stock of the company, and that such interest should
be cumulative. Furthermore, upon liquidation or dissolution of
the company, the "debenture bonds" were entitled to the entire
residue of the company's assets after the corporate debts had
been paid. After having reviewed these stipulations of the in-
struments in suit, the court concluded
All these features are quite characteristic of stock. They
are not at all characteristic of bonds. And we are satisfied
that no error was committed by the court below in holding
that these so-called "bonds" were in effect preferred stock. 0
Preferred Stock with Bond Features. In another line of cases
the courts had to consider the legal nature of securities which
had been designated as "preferred stock," although they were
vested with certain features resembling bonds. The leading case
in this connection is Warren v. King,37 decided by the Supreme
Court in 1883. In this case one King who was the holder of
second mortgage bonds filed a bill to foreclose two mortgages on
the property of the company. Warren, who was the owner of
preferred stock in the company, having been made a defendant
to the suit, filed a cross-bill claiming a lien on the corporate prop-
erty next to the first mortgage. He referred to the stock certifi-
cates which provided that "the preferred stock is to be and
remain a first claim upon the property of the corporation after
its indebtedness, and the holder thereof shall be entitled to re-
ceive from the net earnings of the company seven percent per
annum, payable semi-annually, and to have such interest paid
in full, for each and every year, before any payment of dividend
35. (C. C. A. 2, 1914) 212 Fed. 357.
36. Id. at 360. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on Cass v.
Realty Securities Co. (1911) 132 N. Y. S. 1074, and Hilson Co. v. State
Board (1911) 82 N. J. L. 2, 80 Atl. 929.
37. (1883) 108 U. S. 389, 2 S. Ct. 789, 27 L. ed. 769.
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upon the common stock."38 He then claimed that, by reason of
the lien clause in the certificates, the preferred stockholders had
the preference of a specific and continuing lien and security upon
the property of the company, next after the existing mortgage
indebtedness. The court, however, sustained the demurrer of the
plaintiff, holding that the preferred stockholders had no prefer-
ence over the junior mortgages.
The provision as to the rights of the preferred stock in the
net earnings of the company leaves no doubt as to the mean-
ing of the whole * * *. The holders of preferred stock have
the same relation, by virtue of the certificate, to the corpus
of the property, which they have to its net earnings. Their
position in regard to both is one inferior to that of all
creditors.39
A closely analogous situation was before a federal court in
Hamlin v. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co.40 In that case, preferred
stockholders, who originally had been senior bondholders and in
the course of the reorganization of the company were given pre-
ferred non-voting stock, claimed that their certificates consti-
tuted money obligations secured by a lien next after the exist-
ing first mortgage bonds of the company. The certificates in
question stipulated for the payment of annual "interests" of four
percent out of the net earnings of the company and provided that
"this stock constitutes a lien upon the property and net earnings
of the company next after the company's existing first mortgage"
and that "the company will create no mortgage of its main line,
other than its first mortgage, nor of any part thereof, except
expressly subject to the prior lien of this certificate, without the
consent of the holders of at least two-thirds of this stock." 41 In
spite of this language, the court held that the plaintiffs were not
creditors of the company and were entitled only to a preference
over the common stockholders. Judge Lurton, who delivered the
opinion of the court, cited the Warren case, and pointed out that
"the agreement that the 'company will create no mortgage * * *
other than its first mortgage * * * except subject to the prior lien,
without the consent of the holders of at least two-thirds of this
stock,' is entirely consistent with an intent to give to these pre-
38. See 108 U. S. at 393.
39. Id. at 399.
40. (C. C. A. 6, 1897) 78 Fed. 664.
41. Id. at 668.
1938]
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ferred stockholders a preference over the common stockholders,
not only in relation to dividends, but a preference over them in
the ultimate distribution of the capital stock."42 As to the other
language contained in the certificate, Judge Lurton said: "By
calling a dividend 'interest,' the essential nature of the thing is
hlot changed. We must look deeper. When we do so, we find that
'this 'interest' is to be paid only out of 'the net earnings' after
paying interest upon the first mortgage bonds, and the cost of
maintenance and operation." 43 And it sounds like a warning
hgainst such methods of financing as those applied here, when
Judge Lurton concludes: "If the purpose in providing for these
peculiar shares was to arrange matters so that, under any cir-
cumstances, a part of the principal of the stock might be with-
drawn before the full discharge of all corporate debts, the device
would be contrary to the nature of capital stock, opposed to pub-
lic policy, and void as to creditors affected thereby." 4'
The significance of an optional redemption date in a security
otherwise a share of stock was discussed in Cogeshall v. Georgia
Land & Investment Co.4 5 In this case the plaintiff sought to
recover the face value of several shares of preferred stock, the
certificates of which provided that "this stock may be retired
on or after December 31, 1912, by payment in full of the face
value thereof, together with all dividends then due." The court
dismissed the suit holding that the said provision did not amount
to anything more than a mere option of the company to redeem
the stock if it deemed it wise to do so.46
Another instance of the tendency of the courts not to consider
such provisions for optional redemption as changing the actual
character of preferred stock, is Owatonna Metal Product Co. v.
Hudson Mfg. Co.4 T The plaintiff brought action for the recovery
of the par value of two certificates of preferred stock which pro-
vided that "this preferred stock shall, at the option of the cor-
poration, be subject to redemption on the first day of May, 1932,
42. Id. at 669.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 671. The case is followed in Spencer v. Smith (C. C. A. 8,
1912) 207 Fed. 647, and in Armstrong v. Union Trust & Savings Bank
(C. C. A. 6, 1918) 248 Fed. 268.
45. (1914) 14 Ga. App. 637.
46. Id. at 642. See also Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co. (C. C. A.
6, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 643.
47. (1935) 283 Ill. App. 199.
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or if not so redeemed its time of redemption may be extended
on the same terms, from year to year until all the attached
coupons shall have fallen due and been paid." The court refused
to follow the theory of the plaintiff that he was a creditor and
said
We find no language in plaintiff's certificates that could
possibly lead to an interpretation that they were other than
certificates of preferred shares of stock. They contain no
evidence of a promise or obligation to pay plaintiff money,
but do contain merely an option to redeem, which defendant
may or may not exercise.4 8
In another class of cases preferred stockholders who claimed
to be creditors attempted to avail themselves of clauses in the
certificates depriving them of their voting rights. Thus, in Miller
v. Ratterman,49 where the preferred stock had been issued under
a resolution of the company "that the holders of the certificates
of said preferred stock, shall not have or exercise the right to
vote the same * * * at any meeting of the holders of the capital
stock of said company," the claim was made that this stipulation
raised the preferred stockholders to the status of creditors. But
the court held that the surrender of the right to vote by the
preferred stockholders did not make them corporate creditors.
The court emphasized that the resolution of the company divest-
ing the preferred stockholders of their voting rights clearly
showed that it was the intention of the corporation to authorize
an issue of preferred stock, "for the inhibition against voting
would be wholly useless had it been intended that the holders
should become creditors."50 The court's conclusion that the in-
struments in question constituted genuine preferred stock was
also supported by the "absence of any provision fixing a definite
time when the debt would mature" and by the provision that
dividends had to be paid only out of surplus profits.
The rule laid down by the Ratterman case, that the surrender
of the right to vote by a preferred stockholder does not make
him a creditor, has been repeatedly followed by the courts,51 and
48. Id. at 206. For other cases see 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations(Perm. ed.) 756 ff.
49. (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496.
50. But cf. Best v. Oklahoma Mill Co. (1926) 124 Old. 135, 253 Pac.
1005, where the surrender of the voting right by a preferred stockholder
gave rise to a presumption that he was an actual creditor.
51. For a collection of cases, see 11 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations(Perm. ed.) 741 ff.
19381
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was expressed with force by the Second Circuit in Hazen Atlas
Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves as follows' 2
The rights which the holder of preferred stock has depend
upon his contract with the corporation. The rule is that pre-
ferred stockholders are entitled to vote the same as common
stockholders, unless by the terms of its issue the voting
power has been expressly withheld. But the fact that Van
Dyk, as the holder of the preferred stock, was to have no
right to vote it, except in the event that three dividends
should remain unpaid, and thereupon should have equal vot-
ing rights with the holders of the common stock until all
dividends on the preferred stock were paid, is a matter of no
consequence, so far as the legal question herein involved is
concerned. It does not change Van Dyk's status from that
of a preferred stockholder into that of a creditor.
Finally, the contention has frequently been made by preferred
stockholders that stock certificates containing a promise of guar-
anteed dividends are actually evidences of indebtedness. But the
tendency of the courts, generally, has been to give to such stipu-
lations a construction in accord with the stock character of the
instrument. An important case in this connection is Lockhart v.
Van Alstyne,53 in which case a corporation had issued certificates
of preferred stock under a resolution of the directors that a
semi-annual dividend of five percent shall be guaranteed by the
company. The plaintiff, who claimed to be a creditor, argued
that the guaranty contained a promise in perpetuity to pay a
semi-annual dividend of five percent to the preference stock-
holders, profits or no profits. The court, however, refused to
follow the plaintiff's theory.
We think the guaranty here in question will bear the con-
struction that the preference stockholders shall be entitled
to five percent semi-annual dividends when there are profits
to pay them, and not otherwise. Probably if profits were not
realized to the necessary amount in any one year, they would
be entitled, when they were realized, to have all arrears
made up * * *. This, we think, is what would be the general
understanding of such a guaranty, and this is as far as the
law would permit a corporation to go in guaranteeing divi-
52. (C. C. A. 2, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 716, 722. See also Owatonna Metal
Product Co. v. Hudson Mfg. Co. (1935) 283 Ill. App. 199, 206, quoting from
the Atlas Glass Co. case extensively.
53. (1875) 31 Mich. 76.
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dends to its own members; and to this extent no rule of good
faith or of public policy is in the way.5 4
A similar case was brought before the Massachusetts court in
Field v. Lamson & Goodnow Mfg. Co.55 The plaintiff brought an
action to recover dividends alleged due to him as the owner of
preferred stock in the defendant corporation. The stock in ques-
tion had been issued under a special act of 1885, which provided
that "the holders of said preferred stock shall be entitled to
dividends on the same annually, out of the net profits, in prefer-
ence and priority to the holders of any other stock of said cor-
poration, to the amount of such rate percent thereon, not exceed-
ing seven percent, as may be determined by the vote of said
'corporation" and that dividends to the holders of such preferred
stock * * * may be guaranteed by said corporation." The court
emphasized that under this act the payment of dividends on the
preferred stock was limited to the net profits of the corporation
and that, therefore, the guaranty promise contained in the stock
certificates had to be construed in the light of this provision.58
In Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Association,5 7 a library asso-
ciation had issued preferred stock on which an annual dividend
of eight percent was payable. Under a by-law of the association
these dividends had to be paid before corporate funds were avail-
able for the payment of necessary expenses or upkeep of the
library. Upon the suit of a preferred stockholder for payment
of dividends in the order mentioned, the court declared that the
provision to pay dividends before the payment of necessary ex-
penses and keeping capital intact was in violation of law and
not enforcible. But the court went on,
We see no reason why the contract should not be enforced
by applying to the payment of dividends the net income after
deducting the expenses for conducting the library, and for
losses and deterioration of books, so as to keep the capital
intact and unimpaired. 58
The general principle underlying all those cases of guaranteed
54. Id. at 85.
55. (1894) 162 Mass. 888, 38 N. E. 1126.
56. See 162 Mass. at 392. Accord Miller v. Ratterman (1890) 47 Ohio
St. 141, 24 N. E. 496. But see Burt v. Rattle (1876) 31 Ohio St. 116;
Cotting v. N. Y. & N. Eng. Ry. Co. (1886) 54 Conn. 156, 5 At. 851; Wil-
liams v. Parker (1884) 136 Mass. 204.
57. (1906) 219 Ii. 516, 76 N. E. 707.
58. See 219 Ill. at 524.
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dividends is perhaps most clearly stated in Hazel Atlas Glass Co.
v. Van Dyk & Reeves' 9 where, after review of all the cases on
the subject, it is said
The general rule is that a holder of preferred stock, even
though the preferred dividend is guaranteed, is not regarded
as a creditor of the corporation, and entitled as such to share
with the other creditors in the distribution of the assets. He
is, like the holders of the common stock, merely a stock-
holder, but with this difference, that he is entitled to priority
of payment out of the assets which remain after all debts
are paid; the holders of the common stock sharing in such
assets as are left.60
"Preferred Stock" as Corporate Indebtedness. In the cases
treated thus far the courts have held that preferred stock did not
lose its character as such because of certain anomalous features
with which it had been vested by the parties. The following cases
show, however, that the courts will declare a security to be a
bond or an indebtedness if it partakes of a debt character, even
though the parties have called it "preferred stock."
Such construction by the courts has been frequent in cases of
certificates of "preferred stock" which had been issued under
unusual or anomalous statutes. The leading case in this respect
is Burt v. Rattle.6 1 An Ohio statute of 1870 provided that manu-
ifacturing corporations might issue and dispose of preferred
stock to any amount not exceeding one-half of the cash capital
paid in by the stockholders. The holders of the preferred stock
so issued were to have no voting rights and were not to be liable
for the debts of the company, although the Ohio Constitution
imposed liability upon stockholders in favor of the corporate
creditors. The statute also provided that it should be lawful for
such corporations to guaranty to the holders of preferred stock
semi-annual dividends and the final payment of the stock at such
time as shall be specified in the certificate. In accordance with
this statute, the corporation involved issued so-called certificates
of preferred stock, certifying that the corporation guaranteed
to the holders the payment of four percent semi-annual divi-
dends, and the final payment of the entire amount at a specified
59. (C. C. A. 2, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 716.
60. Id. at 719. For other cases of guaranty of dividends on preferred
stock, see 2 Dodd & Baker, Cases on Business Organization (1934) 363n.
61. (1876) 31 Ohio St. 116.
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time, with the right to convert the preferred stock into common
stock; and the corporation at the same time executed and de-
livered to a trustee its bond and mortgage to secure the holders
of such certificates. When the company failed, the plaintiff,
holder of such a certificate, filed a bill asking to have the mort-
gaged property sold for the satisfaction of the certificate holders.
The court giving judgment for the plaintiff held that the trans-
action between the parties was actually a loaning of money upon
mortgage security, and not the creation of additional members
of the corporation. In reaching this result the court stressed the
point that a different holding would render the Ohio statute un-
constitutional.2
A situation analogous to that in the Burt case was before the
court in Cotting v. New York & New England Railroad Co.,63
in which case a financially embarrassed corporation, which had
been placed into the hands of a receiver, was authorized, by an
act of the Connecticut Legislature of 1884, to issue either second
mortgage bonds or preferred shares of stock. The company
adopted the second alternative and provided that on the pre-
ferred stock an annual dividend of seven percent was to be paid,
commencing October 1, 1885. Since the balance sheet of the
corporation of that year showed a deficiency in its earnings as
compared with its operating expenses and fixed charges, the
question arose whether any dividend could be lawfully declared
in face of the provision of the general corporation act of Con-
necticut that "no corporation shall declare any dividend while
its capital is impaired." The court, construing the act of 1884,
gave it a liberal interpretation. Thus, speaking of the alternative
way of financing to which the company was authorized by the
act, the court said
It was immaterial to the state whether the money was
raised in the one form or the other. The important thing to
be done, in the interest of all concerned, was to raise money
upon adequate security * * *. There is, therefore, some rea-
son for believing that it was the will of the legislature that
the holders of the preferred stock should have the same
security that the holders of the second mortgage bonds
would have had if such bonds had been issued under the act;
62. Id. at 129.
63. (1886) 54 Conn. 156, 5 Atl. 851.
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and they certainly would not have been affected by the de-
ficiency in the accounts.6 4
The court, therefore, concluded that dividends on the preferred
stock lawfully might be declared and paid.65 This being the hold-
ing in the case, the court did not attempt expressly to define the
status of the certificate holders, although the opinion intimated
that they had a creditor-like position.66
A similar suit for the recovery of dividends was the subject
of a litigation in W. C. & Phila. Ry. Co. v. Jackson.67 A special
act of 1855 authorized the West Chester & Philadelphia Railroad
Company to create an issue of preferred stock. With regard to
this preferred stock it was provided in the act "that at any time
after one year from the acceptance of this act, the president and
the managers should have the right, and when the profits of the
road should justify it and one-fourth of the unpreferred stock
should require it, it should be their duty, to redeem all the pre-
ferred stock." The court gave judgment for the plaintiff and
indicated that the "preferred stock" actually constituted an issue
of bonds.,8
The same problem also arose in Massachusetts under a statute
of 1853 which had authorized a certain corporation to issue pre-
ferred stock not to exceed 250 shares, "the said company to give
its guaranty that each share of said stock shall receive semi-
annually dividends of four dollars on each share." The act found
its judicial construction by the Massachusetts court in Williams
v. Parker.19 This was an action by the receiver of the corpora-
tion who sought to recover from the stockholders the dividends
which had been paid them during successive years, although the
liabilities of the corporation always exceeded its assets. The
,court sustained the demurrer of the defendants, holding that
they lawfully received the dividends paid to them by the corpora-
tion.
The question which underlies all others in this case is
whether the guaranty that each share of the preferred stock
64. See 54 Conn. at 166-167.
65. It must be noted that there were no creditors who could claim the
corporate assets. But query, whether the decision would have been differ-
ent if the company had had outstanding debts and liabilities?
66. (1886) 54 Conn. 156, 170.
67. (1875) 77 Pa. 321.
68. Id. at 327. See also Totten v. Tison (1875) 54 Ga. 139.
69. (1884) 136 Mass. 204.
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'shall receive semi-annual dividends of four dollars on each
share' is an absolute guaranty, or is conditional upon the
earning of sufficient profits by the corporation. * * * The
general legislative policy of the Commonwealth * ** appears
to be that holders of special stock shall be regarded as credi-
tors of the corporation for the dividends guaranteed, which
have become payable. * * * The defendants, so far as ap-
pears by the bill, rightfully received the dividends paid
them.0
Finally, a situation which arose in Maryland should be men-
tioned. There, a statute of 1868 provided that a corporation in
need of money may obtain the same either on bonds secured by
mortgage or upon issue of preferred stock. In the latter case,
the corporation was authorized to guarantee dividends of six
percent out of the profits. In 1880, an amendment to the statute
of 1868 was passed, which provided that "the said preferred
stock shall be and constitute a lien on the franchises and prop-
erty of such corporation, and have priority over any subsequently
created mortgage, or other incumbrance." 7' 1 The statute thus
amended came before the Maryland court in Heller v. National
Marine Bank,'2 in which case preferred stock had been issued by
a corporation and, when the company became insolvent, the pre-
ferred stockholders claimed that under the amended statute they
were preferred creditors and entitled to have their shares paid
back in full. The court gave judgment for the plaintiffs and held
that the so-called preferred stock constituted a lien on the com-
pany's franchises and property owned at the time the stock was
issued. In the opinion of the court this holding was the necessary
result of the amendment of 1880. With regard to this amend-
ment it was said that "the last clause, giving the shareholder a
lien and declaring a preference in his favor, altered the nature
of the preferred stock and made it something that it had not been
under the Act of 1868.3* * * The substance of the thing was
changed, the name was retained."7 4
While in the cases just discussed the terms of special acts of
the Legislature have led the courts to construe certificates of
70. Id. at 206.
71. Md. Civil Code (1880) art. 23, sec. 294.
72. (1899) 89 Ind. 602, 43 Atl. 800.
73. See 89 Md. 614.
74. Id. at 617. The case is followed in Rogers, Brown & Co. v. Citizens
National Bank (1901) 93 Md. 613, 49 Atl. 843.
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"preferred stock" as bonds or evidences of indebtedness, there
is still another class of cases where independent of any legislative
authorization so-called preferred stock was issued in such a way
and under such terms as to make the transaction actually a bor-
rowing of money. Particularly, where a fixed and absolute ma-
turity date had been inserted into the "preferred stock" certifi-
cates, the courts have declared that the certificates were evi-
dences of indebtedness and the holders of them bondholders or
creditors of the corporation.7 .5
An early case of this kind is Cook v. Equitable Building &
Loan Association.7 6 A building and loan association had issued
"coupon stock" which was sold at its full face value of $100 per
share and was to bear six percent annual interest payable semi-
annually. The holders of this stock were granted the privilege
of withdrawing the stock upon ninety days' notice in writing,
whereupon they were to receive one hundred dollars per share
for each share surrendered, together with accrued interest. The
association reserved the right to call in and cancel this stock,
giving the holders thereof six months' notice in writing. The
court construing the stock certificates held that the holders of
the "coupon stock" were actually creditors.
The holder of this stock has really no interest in the profits
or losses of the business of the association. * * * We cannot
possibly distinguish this from any other case of borrowing
and lending money. It is just as if the association had ob-
tained money on its note or bond upon 90 days after demand,
with interest.77
The Cook case was relied on as authority in a subsequent
Georgia decision dealing with a similar situation. In Savannah
Real Estate, Loan & Building Co. v. Silverberg,/8 certificates of
"preferred stock" had been issued, which deprived their holders
of the right to vote and provided that "the entire issue of this
preferred stock shall be retired by the company on January 1,
1897, at its face value." Upon the suit of a certificate holder for
the face value of the certificate, the court held that the so-called
75. The tendency of the courts seems to be to disregard optional re-
demption dates as changing the legal character of preferred stock. See the
discussion of Cogeshall v. Ga. Land & Investment Co., and Owatonna Metal
Product Co. v. Hudson Mfg. Co. in the text.
76. (1898) 104 Ga. 814, 30 S. E. 911.
77. See 104 Ga. at 829.
78. (1899) 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908.
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preferred stock was actually a certificate of indebtedness which
had to be repaid by the company as stipulated. The opinion,
after having stated that the mere surrender of the right to vote
by the stockholder would not make him lose this status,7 9 made
the existence of the absolute promise of the corporation to pay
the face value of the certificate on a definite maturity date the
ratio decidendi.80
In Wright v. Johnston,1 it was not difficult for the Iowa court
to uncover the bond nature of certificates of so-called preferred
stock. Since this case involves a very obvious example of bonds
in the disguise of "preferred stock" certificates, the amendment
to the articles of the corporation authorizing these certificates
in its appurtenant parts is set out in full.
Said preferred stock shall receive cumulative dividends at
the rate of 8% per fiscal year, paid semi-annually out of the
net profits, but shall be entitled to no dividends after the
8% cumulative dividends shall have been paid. All unpaid
dividends on the preferred stock shall be paid before unpaid
dividends are paid on the common stock. In the event of the
dissolution or liquidation of the corporation, the holders of
the preferred stock shall receive the par value of their pre-
ferred stock, plus unpaid dividends thereon, out of the assets
of the corporation, before the holders of the common stock
receive any of the said assets. Any surplus assets shall go
to the holders of the common stock * * *. The corporation
may purchase the preferred stock or any portion thereof, at
par, plus unpaid dividends thereon, at any time, upon giving
three months' notice by mail to the holder or owner of said
stock, as shown by the books of the company, and the cor-
poration shall purchase said preferred stock, or any portion
thereof, at par, plus unpaid dividends, upon six months'
notice given the company by mail * * *. No mortgage of any
of the corporate assets shall be executed without the written
consent of the holders of the preferred stock then outstand-
ing. The word "stockholder," as used herein, shall refer to
the holders of common stock only, and the holders of the pre-
ferred stock shall not be entitled to vote.
79. For other authorities sustaining the proposition that the surrender
of voting rights does not render preferred stockholders creditors, see Miller
v. Ratterman (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 496, and Hazel Atlas Glass
Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves (C. C. A. 2, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 716, discussed in
text.
80. Building Co. v. Silverberg (1899) 108 Ga. 281, 287, 33 S. E. 908
Cf. Cogeshall v. Ga. Land & Investment Co. (1914) 14 Ga. App. 637.
81. (1918) 183 Iowa 807, 167 N. W. 680.
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Considering those provisions, the court concluded that the "pre-
ferred stock" certificates partook of all the elements peculiar to
bonds and none of those characteristics to shares of stock.
It is largely a matter of contract, and, in the absence of
statutory limitations, it seems that any condition may be
included in one class of stock which does not tend to impair
the corporate capital available for the satisfaction of credi-
tors. * * * The attitude of the preferred shareholder on
these conditions is that of creditor. He invests his money,
is assured a fixed rate of interest, and may enforce repay-
ment of the money, with interest, on specified notice. The
only possible gain is the rate, definitely fixed. The only risk
is possibility of a shareholder's liability in event of insol-
vency before he is repaid voluntarily or according to the
terms of the amendment to the articles.82
Two years later, similar certificates came before the Iowa
court in Allen v. Northwestern Mfg. Co.8  The certificate of
preferred stock provided that "it shall bear interest at eight
percent per annum, payable annually, on the 28th day of October
of each year, out of the net profits of the business of the com-
pany, and before any dividends or surplus are declared or paid
on the common stock" and that "this certificate, with interest,
shall be paid in full, to the lawful holder thereof, at the expira-
tion of two years from date, upon demand therefor, and sur-
render of this certificate." The Wright case was not cited by the
court, but it was followed in substance when the court declared
"that the transaction was a loan by plaintiff to the defendant,
by which defendant agreed to pay, with interest, at the end of
two years, and that he was not, strictly speaking, a stockholder."8 4
The Georgia and Iowa cases just mentioned were cited with
approval by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Best v. Oklahomm
Mill Co.8 5 A so-called preferred stock certificate was to be con-
strued by the court. Plaintiff, claiming to be a creditor of the
corporation, referred to the third paragraph of the certificate
which provided that "this certificate of preferred stock matures
82. See 183 Iowa at 812.
83. (1920) 189 Iowa 731, 179 N. W. 130. See also Booth v. Union Fibre
Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 7, 162 N. W. 677, where in the absence of claims by
creditors the court upheld a stipulation to redeem the preferred stock of the
company without determining, however, whether the transaction was a loan
resulting in a debt.
84. See 189 Iowa at 737.
85. (1926) 124 Okl. 135, 253 Pac. 1005.
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on February 1, 1925, and will be redeemed or retired by the
Oklahoma Mill Company on that date by the full payment of the
par value thereof, together with any cumulative dividends." The
court followed the plaintiff's theory stressing the compulsory
character of the redemption clause in the certificate.8 0
The problem was presented differently in Arthur R. Jones
Syndicate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,87 where the par-
ties to the transaction originally contemplated the making of a
loan, at the rate of fourteen percent, but in order to avoid a
conflict with the usury laws of Illinois, the corporation issued
preferred stock which was to be redeemed "on July 1, 1922, by
payment of the par value thereof plus a dividend at the rate of
14 percent per annum from the date hereof to the date of such
payment." The court held that the transaction was actually a
loan.
Aside from the form of the instrument which the parties
adopted to embody their contracts, there is no evidence to
contradict the asserted relationship of debtor and creditor.
Not only does all the oral testimony confirm this conclusion,
but the payments and other written evidence strongly con-
firm the words of the witnesses.88
The court concluded that the facts evidenced a loan, "the true
character of which was concealed to cover the usury feature."8 9
Taxation of Hybrid Securities. "Hybrid securities" have also
been the frequent subjects of tax litigations. An early case of
this kind was Miller v. Ratterman," in which a credit tax had
been levied on certificates of preferred stock the holders of which
86. See 124 Okl. at 137. In deciding that plaintiff was a corporate credi-
tor, the court also emphasized the fact that he had surrendered his right
to vote. However, the majority of the courts have not regarded the absence
of voting power as evidence of the debt character of hybrid securities.
Some cases have even gone so far as to hold that the surrender of the
right to vote constitutes a presumption of the stock nature of the security.
See Miller v. Ratterman (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 157, 24 N. E. 496, where
it is said that "the inhibition against voting would be wholly useless had
it been intended that the holders should become creditors."
87. (C. C. A. 7, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 833.
88. Id. at 834. As to the testimony of the witnesses the court said: "All
the witnesses who testified before the Board of Tax Appeals described the
transaction as a loan and stated that the parties made use of the so-called
first preferred stock as a mere expedient to circumvent the force and effect
of the usury laws."
89. Id. at 834. See also People ex rel. Cohn v. Miller (1904) 180 N. Y.
16, 72 N. E. 525.
90. (1890) 47 Ohio St. 141, 24 N. E. 494.
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were guaranteed annual dividends and were deprived of their
voting rights. The tax collector claimed that those stipulations
designated the securities as certificates of indebtedness and made
them, therefore, subject to a tax on credits under the law of
Ohio. On the suit of a taxpayer to enjoin the collection of this
tax the court held that the certificates constituted genuine pre-
ferred stock and that the tax was, therefore, unlawful. The
court declared that the guaranty of dividends and the non-voting
feature were not inconsistent with the character of the certificate
as preferred stock and that "the absence of any provision fixing
a definite time when the debt would mature" was fatal to the
tax collector's contention.-
In Hilson Co. v. State Board of Assessors,02 the question was
whether the state taxing board properly considered the issue by
the company of three thousand "debenture certificates" as out-
standing stock for the purpose of determining the franchise tax
of the corporation. The court upheld the tax stating
These debenture certificates, although they recite that the
corporation is indebted to the holders thereof in the amount
of their face value, disclose on their face that their holders
are clothed with rights and privileges which our Corpora-
tion Act permits stockholders only to enjoy. 3
The court was supported in its conclusion by the certificate of
organization of the company which set out that the total amount
of the authorized capital stock of the corporation was $1,000,000
of which $400,000 was to consist of "debenture stock."
The case of People ex rel. Cohn & Co. v. Miller,- involved the
right of a corporation to deduct the sum of $100,000, the total
amount of its preferred stock, as a debt, in the assessment of a
franchise tax. The certificates issued by the corporation were
called "preferred debenture shares" and provided that, in case of
liquidation of the company, the holders were to be paid in full
and that the company was not to create any lien superior to the
lien of the certificates. Moreover, it was provided that on a cer-
tain date the company was to pay to the registered holders of
the certificates the face value thereof. Considering these provi-
sions, the court strongly intimated that the securities were actu-
91. See 47 Ohio St. at 159.
92. (1911) 82 N. J. L. 2, 80 Atl. 929.
93. See 82 N. J. L. at 3.
94. (1904) 180 N. Y. 16, 72 N. E. 525.
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ally certificates of indebtedness and that in the case of a suit by
one of the certificate holders for the face amount, judgment
might be given for him.9 5 But in its relation to the taxing state,
the company could not advance the contention that the preferred
stock was in reality a corporate indebtedness, since the articles
of the company listed it as part of the capital stock.98
Finally, the federal courts have had to deal with "hybrid
securities" in the light of federal income tax regulations. The
cases arising in this connection were usually founded on the pro-
vision of the Federal Rhvenue Act that to determine the net in-
come of a corporation there may be deducted from the gross
income all interest paid on indebtedness, 97 a provision which is
modified by the Treasury Regulation that "so-called interest on
preferred stock, which is in reality a dividend thereon, cannot
be deducted in computing net income."98
Thus, in Arthur R. Jones Syndicate v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue,99 the corporation claimed that a certain payment
constituted interest charges which were deductible from its in-
come. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who was de-
fendant in the suit, alleged that the payment represented divi-
dends which could not be deducted. It was found that the cor-
poration had originally intended to contract a loan at the rate of
fourteen percent, but on the advice of counsel abandoned this
plan and issued preferred stock which was to be redeemed at a
certain date by payment of the par value thereof plus a dividend
of fourteen percent per annum. The court found that the trans-
action was actually a loan disguised as an issue of preferred
stock in order to conceal its usury features. The question then
was whether the corporation should be allowed to show the true
character of the transaction in order to avoid the tax. The court
admitting that there was some force in the argument of the com-
missioner that the corporation should be estopped from denying
the words of the certificates, went on to say
We conclude that a taxpayer who borrows money at a
usurious rate of interest and who, to conceal the usury, is
95. See 180 N. Y. at 24.
96. Ibid.
97. (1936) 49 Stat. 1659, 26 U. S. C. A. sec. 23(b).
98. Article 564 of Treasury Regulations 65, promulgated under the
Revenue Act of 1924.
99. (C. C. A. 7, 1927) 23 F. (2d) 833.
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compelled to execute a document which does not correctly
describe the relationship of the parties, may, as against the
government, disclose the true relationship of debtor and
creditor. Sums by it paid as interest, regardless of the name
by which it is called, may be deducted by the taxpayer from
its income.10°
In Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,'10 the company issued preferred stock in 1925 which was
callable after three years at 110. In 1928 the directors of the
company resolved "that such certificates of preferred stock be
deemed and are hereby declared to be certificates of indebtedness
of this corporation." Furthermore, on the books of the company,
the preferred stock was carried as "preferred stockholders' inter-
est account." The court held that the preferred stockholders
could not be treated as creditors and that the company was, there-
fore, not entitled to deduct the dividends from its return as inter-
est. The opinion pointed out that the case was clearly distin-
guishable from the Arthur R. Jones Syndicate case.
In the instant case the preferred stock could, at the op-
tion of the corporation, be redeemed within three years at
110. There was, however, no obligation to redeem. In the
Jones Syndicate there was an express provision to pay at
five years. It was in effect a bond payable in five years. 0 2
Since the certificates thus embodied genuine preferred stock, the
court declared that "neither the resolution passed long after the
sale of the preferred stock nor the method of bookkeeping have
any probative value.103
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 0. P. P. Holding Cor-
poration,0 4 the corporation had issued debenture bonds which
were subordinated, both as to principal and interest, to the claims
of all other creditors. It was also provided that the company
might at its option suspend or defer the payment of interest
"but such suspension of payment shall in no wise relieve the Cor-
poration of the obligation to pay the same at some future time."
The bonds had a definite maturity date. On the theory that it
100. Id. at 834.
101. (C. C. A. 9, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 595.
102. Id. at 597.
103. Ibid. Accord, Finance & Investment Corporation v. Burnet (App.
D. C. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 444; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Proctor
Shop (C. C. A. 9, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 792.
104. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 11.
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represented a dividend payment, the Commissioner disallowed a
deduction of $20,000 from gross income, which the corporation
claimed to be a payment of interest on the debenture bonds. A
Federal Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the Board of
Tax Appeals reversing the determination of the Commissioner.
Judge Swan delivering the opinion of the court declared that the
securities in question were genuine bonds, the interest on which
might be properly deducted from the corporate gross income.
We do not think it fatal to the debenture holder's status
as a creditor that his claim is subordinated to those of gen-
eral creditors. The fact that ultimately he must be paid a
definite sum at a fixed time marks his relationship to the
corporation as that of creditor rather than shareholder. The
final criterion between creditor and shareholder we believe
to be the contingency of payment. The shareholder is en-
titled to nothing, prior to liquidation, except out of earnings.
Even on liquidation, at least in New York, arrears of cumu-
lative dividends are confined to earnings. * * * These de-
benture bondholders were not so limited. The interest could
be deferred, but it was not lost, though the company had no
earnings; it could be collected, together with the principal,
in 1954 regardless of whether there should be a surplus. 05
105. Id. at 12.
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